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Abstract  
This study aimed to determine the effect of leverage and firm size toward earnings management. 
This study used a sample of the financial report data from manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia stock exchange for the 2013-2017 period. The data analysis testing in this study employed 
EViews (Econometric Views). The results showed that the best panel regression model in this study was 
random effect model. Consistent with agency theory and positive accounting theory, leverage and firm 
size has a positive effect on the earnings management for manufacturing companies in Indonesia. The 
empirical results showed that leverage and firm size increases provide encouragement for managers to 
manipulate earnings. 
Keywords: Earnings Management; Leverage; Firm Size; Positive Accounting Theory; Agency Theory 
 
Introduction 
Earnings management is a serious problem faced by practitioners, accounting and financial 
academics over the past few decades. Schipper (1989) argues that earnings management is an intentional 
management intervention in the financial reporting process with the aim of obtaining personal benefits. 
According to Scott (2015) earnings management is the choice of accounting policies by management that 
affect earnings. Healy and Wahlen (1999) assume earnings management occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead 
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcome that depend on reported accounting numbers. The problem of earnings management 
does not only occur in developed countries (the Enron case, WorldCom case, Xerox case etc)), but also in 
developing countries, such as Indonesia. There are some companies have been entangled in earnings 
management cases include PT Kimia Farma Tbk (2001), PT Indofarma Tbk (2001), PT Katarina Utama 
Tbk (2010) and most recently PT Inovisi Infracom Tbk (2014). The increasing attention to the quality of 
reported earnings makes the study of earnings management still important and relevant to be discussed 
(Levitt., 2000) and also research on earnings management in emerging market received great attention 
from researchers (Bao and Lewellyn., 2016). 
 
Positive accounting theory has highlighted hypotheses for earnings management such as debt 
covenants, management compensation contracts, and political costs. Debt covenant hypothesis of positive 
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accounting theory (Watts & Zimmerman., 1986) presented that the closer a company with the violation of 
credit agreement based on accounting was more allowed the company manager to select the accounting 
procedure which moved the reported profit from the next period to now. Thus, the link between debt 
contracts and opportunistic behavior of earnings manipulation indicates a possible relationship between 
debt policy and earnings management (Lazzem and Jilani., 2018).  
 
Some studies that focus on these relationships still produce mixed results. Research conducted by 
Defond and Jimbalvo (1994) and Chamberlain et al (2014) found that leverage has a positive effect on 
earnings management when companies want to reduce the likelihood of violating debt agreements and 
increase the bargaining value of companies during debt negotiations. Beatty and Weber (2003), and 
Dichev and Skinner (2002) indicate that firm have high financial leverage potentially lead to increase 
accrual earnings management and other earnings increasing accounting choices. This is due to avoid debt 
covenant violations. Surveyed by Zagers (2009) found that in the firms with increasing financial leverage, 
leverage lead to earning management with the purpose of impacting on operation cash flow. Sari (2013) 
suggest that there is a very close relationship between leverage and capital structure and expenditure. 
Debt is an agreement between a company as a debtor and a creditor. The greater the leverage ratio, the 
higher the value of the company's debt. Thus, the company's financial leverage can also be a trigger for 
management to take earnings management. On the other hand, different studies have found a negative 
effect relationship between leverage and earnings management. Jelinek (2007) suggest that leverage 
increases will reduce earnings management. Zamri et al (2013), Afza and Rashid (2014) and Lazzem and 
Jilani (2018) found that the level of leverage was able to reduce earnings management. Companies that 
have a high level of leverage are likely to face tighter control from the creditor, thus management is less 
motivated to do earnings management. Vakilafard and Mortazavi (2015) explain that once financial 
leverage is increasing, the management incentive is decreasing for accrual-based earnings management. 
Actually, financial leverage increasing and then the pressure of debt covenant and strict audits for 
leveraged firms lead to limit manager's opportunistic behaviors, then earnings management is going to 
reduce. 
 
Agency theory used to explain earnings management. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define that 
agency relations occur when one party gives another party delegation to do work or service and give 
authority in decision making (Jao & Pagalung., 2011). Earnings management arises due to agency 
relationships between shareholders (principal) and managers (agents). This agency relationship will create 
an agency conflict, because there is a difference of interests between the principal and the agent. This 
conflict will lead to information asymmetry because management does not disclose the information in an 
honest and transparent way to shareholders. Based on agency theory that the larger companies will faced 
bigger information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling., 1976). Large companies face larger agency 
conflicts which indicate that the possibility of opportunistic behavior will occur even greater. On the other 
hand, positive accounting theory also gives an argument that companies that have high political cost, their 
managers will choose the accounting method to suspend the current period earnings to next period and 
future reported earnings to be minimized. Political costs are accrued because high profitability attracts the 
attention of consumers and the media. Moses (1997) state that companies are more likely to have a greater 
incentive for income smoothing (one form of earnings management) compared with small companies, as 
it has a greater political cost. Political costs occur high due to the profitability of the company that can 
attract the attention of the media and consumers. Barton and Simko (2002) and Ali et al (2015) have used 
agency theory to explain the relationship between firm size and earnings management. Barton and Simko 
(2002), Ali et al (2015), and Turegun (2016) found a positive relationship between company size and 
earnings management large companies tend to do earnings management because large companies are 
under great pressure to fulfill the expectations of financial analysts. On the other hand, research 
conducted by Kim (2003) and Swastika (2013) reject agency theory. The study states that larger 
companies have strong internal control. Large companies also tend to be audited by big 4 audit companies 
so that the possibility of engaged in earnings management becomes smaller. Some previous studies still 
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have mixed results between leverage, firm size and earnings management. These diverse results indicate a 
research gap. Thus, further research is needed to examine the relationship between leverage and firm size 





The population used in this study were the companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX). The sampling method used was purposive sampling method. These criteria include companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and in the category of manufacturing companies during the 2013-
2017 period. During the 2013-2017 period, the companies’ financial and annual reports had been 
accessible and audited. They have the data needed for the research variables during 2013-2017. 
 
The data analysis testing in this study employed EViews (Econometric Views). This study applied 
panel data regression. There are three types of models, Commond Effects Model (CE), Fixed Effects 
Model (FE), and Random Effects Model (RE). Of the three models that have been estimated, the most 
expropriate model was chosen based on the characteristics of the data to answer the objectives of the 






Of the 144 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, there are 35 
companies that inconsistently report financial and annual reports to the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Then, 
as many as 24 companies used units of currencies other than rupiah and 10 companies did not have the 
data needed for the research variables. Therefore, the samples in this study were as many as 75 
manufacturing companies with the years of observation from 2013 to 2017. 
 
 
The Most Appropriate Regression Model Selection 
 
The panel data regression model is divided into three models, namely common effects, fixed 
effects and random effects. The first test was Chow test to see the best model between common effects 
and fixed effects. The results obtained in the Chow test are fixed effects as the best model. Then proceed 
to the second test with the Hausmant test to see the best model between fixed effect and random effect. 
The results obtained in this test are random effects as the best model. Then the most appropriate panel 





The regression model used in this study was the random effect model. The inferential statistical 
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                     Tabel 1 Inferential statistical results from random effect testing 
 Coefficient T-statistic Prob 
C -2.243568 -12.53541 0.0000 
Leverage (X1) 0.278612 4.330173 0.0000 
Ukuran Perusahaan (X2) 0.070515 10.40191 0.0000 
 
 
From the hypotheses testing, it can be seen that the probability is less than 5% of significant level 
meaning, then H0 is rejected and Ha is accepted. It means that the independent variables partially 
(individually) have significant effect on the dependent variable. The probability is greater than the 
significant level of 5%, then H0 is accepted, and Ha is rejected which means the independent variables 
partially (individually) have no effect on the dependent variable.  
 
Based on Table 1, it can be seen that the accepted hypotheses are the hypotheses H1 and H2. The 
coefficient value  in this study is shown in the R-squared value of 70,9393%. This value means that the 
independent variables used in this study explain 70,9393% of the dependent variable, and the rest is 





The results of the first hypothesis study showed that leverage has a positive effect on earnings 
management. The results of this study support agency theory and positive accounting theory on the debt 
contract hypothesis, companies that have high leverage tend to do earnings management because the 
company is threatened with bankruptcy so it is unable to meet debt payments on time. The results of this 
study are also in line with the research of Defond and Jimbalvo (1994), and Chamberlain et al. (2014) 
which explain that companies tend to engage in earnings management when the condition of the company 
approaches the violation of the debt agreement. 
 
The results of the study showed that the size of the company has a positive effect on earnings 
management. The results of the study support agency theory which states that the larger the company, the 
greater information asymmetry and agency conflict faced by the company. The results of this study are in 
line with the research of Barton and Simko (2002) and Ali et al (2015). Their study found a positive 
relationship between company size and earnings management, the larger the company, the more likely 
management to do earnings management because large companies are under big pressure to fulfill the 





This study aims to examine the determinants of earnings management behavior. The factors 
tested are leverage and company size. This study uses samples in the form of financial report data from 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia stock exchange for the period 2013-2017. The results of 
this study indicate that leverage is a determinant of earnings management. The results of this study 
support agency theory and positive accounting theory on the debt contract hypothesis. Companies that 
have high leverage tend to do earnings management because the company is threatened with bankruptcy 
so it is unable to meet debt payments on time. The next results also support agency theory that the larger 
the company, the greater information asymmetry and agency conflict faced by the company. Larger 
company tend to do earnings management because large companies are under big pressure to fulfill the 
expectations of financial analysts. 
 
International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding (IJMMU) Vol. 6, No. 1, February 2019 
 




Limitation and Suggestion 
 
This study has limitations, the inconsistency of the companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in disclosing information to the public. Many manufacturing companies that have not 
consistently disclosed financial reports and annual reports in their entirety (for the 2013-2017 observation 
year), which has greatly reduced the research sample. Future studies are expected to be able to expand the 
sample using all companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange so that they are better able to describe 





Afza, T., & Rashid, B. (2014). Opportunistic Earnings Management, Debt and Diversification: Empirical 
Evidence for Manufacturing Firms of Pakistan. Sci. Int. 26(5): 2489–2494. 
 
Ali, M. A., Noor, M. A., Khurshid, M. K., Mahmood, A. (2015). Impact of Firm Size on Earnings 
Management; A Study of Textile Sector of Pakistan. European Journal of Business and Management. 7: 
28. 
 
Bao, S. R., & Lewellyn, K, B. (2016). Ownership Structure and Earnings Management in Emerging 
Markets: An Institutionalized Agency Perspective. International Business Review. Vol. xxx. Page. Xxx-
xxx. 
 
Barton, J., and P. Simko. (2002). The Balance Sheet as an Earnings Management Constraint. The 
Accounting Review. 77 (Supplement): 1-27. 
 
Beatty, A., & Weber, J. (2008). The Effects of Debt Contracting on Voluntary Accounting Method 
Changes. The Accounting Review, 78(1): 119-142. 
 
Chamberlain, T. W., Butt, U. R., Sarkar, S., (2014). Accruals and Real Earnings Management Around 
Debt Covenant Violations. Int. Adv. Econ. Res., 20(1): 119–120. 
 
DeFond, M. L., & Jiambalvo, J. (1994). Debt Covenant Violation and Manipulation of Accruals. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 17: 145-176. 
 
Dichev, I. D., & Skinner, D. J. (2002). Large Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis. Journal 
of Accounting Reasearch, 40(4): 1091-1123. 
 
Healy, P. M., & Wahlen, J. M. (1999). A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its 
Implications for Standard Setting. Accounting horizons, 13(4): 365-383. 
 
Jao, R., & Pagalung, G. (2011). Corporate Governance, Ukuran Perusahaan, dan Leverage Terhadap 
Manajemen Laba Perusahaan Manufaktur. Jurnal Akuntansi dan Auditing, 8(1). 
 
Jelinek, K. (2007). The Effect of Leverage Increases on Earnings Management. Journal of Business & 
Economic Studies, 13(2): 24-46. 
 
Jensen, M. C. & Meckling W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 350-360. 
 
International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding (IJMMU) Vol. 6, No. 1, February 2019 
 




Kim, Y., Liu, C., & Rhee, S. G. (2003). The Relation of Earnings Management to Firm Size. Social 
Science Research Network. 
 
Lazzem, S., & Jilani, F. (2018). The Impact of Leverage on Accrual based Earnings Management: The 
Case of Listed French Firms. Research in International Business and Finance, 44: 350-358. 
 
Levitt, A. (2000). Testimony Concerning Commission’s Auditor Independence Proposal before the 
Senate Subcommittee on Securities Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 28 September. 
http://www.sec.gov/news/ testimony/ts152000.htm. 
 
Moses, D. O. (1997). Income Smooting and Incentives: Empirical Using Accounting Changes. The 
Accounting Review, 62(2): 358-377.  
 
Sari, S. R. (2013). Pengaruh Leverage Dan Mekanisme Good Corporate Governance Terhadap 
Manajemen Laba. Jurnal Ilmu & Riset Akuntansi, 2(6). 
 
Schipper, K. (1989). Commentary on Earnings Management. Accounting Horizons, 3(4): 91-102. 
 
Scott, W.  R. (2015). Financial Accounting Theory. Second Edition. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall 
Canada Inc. 
 
Swastika, D. L. T. (2013). Corporate Governance, Firm Size, and Earnings Management: Evidence in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. Journal of Business and Management, 10(4): 77-82. 
 
Turegun, N. (2016). Effects of Borrowing Cost, Firm Size, and Characteristics of Board of Directors on 
Earnings Management Types: A Study at Borsa Istanbul. Asia Pasific Journal of Accounting & 
Economics. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2016.1246192. 
 
Vakilifard, H., & Mortazari, M. S., (2016). The Impact of Financial Leverage on Aaccrual-Based and 
Real Earnings Management. International Journal Academic Researchin Accounting Financial 
Management Science, 6(2): 53–60. 
 
Watts, R., & Zimmerman, J. (1986). Positive Theory of Accounting. Englewood Cliffs, NY: Prentice-
Hall. 
 
Zagers, I. (2009). The effect of Leverage Increases on Real Earnings Management. Working Paper. 
 
Zamri, N., Abdul Rahman, R., Mohd  Isa,  N. S. (2013). The Impact of Leverage on Real Earnings 









Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to the journal. 
 
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons 
Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 
